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ABSTRACT
Reforms in land governance are assumed to significantly enhance
the security of tenure in conflict-affected countries, through
stimulating the resolution of land disputes, contributing to better
control of property rights and reorganising the institutional
framework for land management. Yet, this paper highlights the
ambiguous outcomes of such reforms in situation of institutional
multiplicity. Fieldwork in Ngozi province in northern Burundi points
out how land-related reforms such as decentralising the
administrative authority at the communal and hill levels and policy
reforms in the formalisation of property rights have positive impacts
in terms of dealing with specific land disputes and fostering local
feelings of tenure security in the aftermath of the 2000 Arusha
Peace Agreement. However, land governance reforms have also
fuelled the proliferation of land governing institutions and fostered
confusion among state and non-state authorities about which rules
to apply and their roles in mitigating tensions over landownership
and enforcing property rights. Actually, while introducing new laws,
policies, institutions and practices, land governance reforms have
produced mixed effects in securing local tenure for most
community members and increased contestations against the
authority of government representatives at the local level.
KEYWORDS
Burundi; governance
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Introduction
Violent conflicts significantly affect land tenure and land governance. In post-war settings,
forced displacement is likely to result in increasing competition for natural resources
through the proliferation of overlapping claims over access to land and property rights
(Fischer and Vollmer 2009; Crisp 2010). Beyond their fundamental contribution to iden-
tity and belonging, livelihood strategies, and agrarian economies in most developing
countries (Kamungi, Oketch, and Huggins 2005; Lund 2011), access to land and property
rights are instrumental for consolidating peace, and for constituting and negotiating
authority and power in the aftermath of violent conflicts (Lund and Boone 2013; Sikor
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and Lund 2009; Unruh 2003; Unruh and Williams 2013). In this respect, a common
response of policy makers to these challenges has often been enhancing dispute resolution
and guaranteeing the security of tenure and property rights through the adoption of poli-
cies concerning housing, land and property restitution for refugees and displaced people,
and decentralising land services. Such reforms are foregrounded in peace agreements,
which presumably provide a collectively binding formal framework for addressing
land-related grievances, redressing rural livelihoods, (re-) establishing effective land
administration and institutions, and contribute to post-war recovery and reconstruction
(McCallin 2013; Todorovski 2016; Unruh and Williams 2013).
Yet, the question remains how such land reforms grounded in peace agreements work
out in practice and whether they effectively contribute to strengthening local land gover-
nance and enhancing tenure security in conflict-affected settings. Actually, land gover-
nance reforms may often fail to reach the expected outcomes of regulating and enforcing
land management and mitigating land disputes, or increasing localised and participatory
decision-making processes (McCallin 2012; Unruh 2005). They may fuel the proliferation
of new rules and institutions, and induce competition among land-governing actors, and
even (re-) activate questions of identity and ethnic belonging (Justin and van Leeuwen
2016; Kobusingye, van Leeuwen, and van Dijk 2016).
This paper therefore analyses to what extent land governance reforms contribute to
institutional multiplicity in land governance and effectively impact local tenure (in-)
security, with regard to dispute resolution and the formalization of property rights for
different social actors in the aftermath of the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement in Bur-
undi.1 It also intends to examine the competition about the exercise of authority
among several land-governing actors and which rules to apply. Although contempo-
rary scholars and experts have provided relevant insights into the governance of land
disputes in Burundi (International Crisis Group 2014b; Ndayirukiye and Takeuchi
2014; Nyenyezi Bisoka and Ansoms 2012; van Leeuwen 2010) and the recent land
reforms and localised land registration (Betge, Irutingabo, and Westerbeek 2017; Inter-
national Crisis Group 2014a; Munezero and Niyonkuru 2016), they often overlook the
actual outcomes of such land governance reforms in terms of multiplying policies,
rules, laws and institutions, and in complicating governance processes and practices.
The analysis develops on the basis of work of scholars such as Lund and Boone
(2013), Peluso and Lund (2011) and Sikor and Lund (2009), who point out the inter-
connectedness between notions of authority and control and the social, institutional
and political processes and practices related to the governance of land and property
rights. Actually, these scholars demonstrate the critical and strategic role of land gov-
ernance for negotiating property and power relations, and institutional and political
control.
This paper argues that the land reforms grounded in the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement
add more complexity to preexisting situation of institutional multiplicity in land gover-
nance and fuel confusion and institutional competition about the rules applied and
authority structures. Land tenure reforms create opportunities for (non-) state institu-
tional actors for redefining, reinforcing or negotiating decision-making power, authority
and control. Furthermore, they lead to critical ambiguities in land administration and
land service provision, contested notions of tenure (in-) security, and to contested rela-
tions of legitimacy and authority between various institutions.
2 R. TCHATCHOUA-DJOMO
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This paper is based on qualitative fieldwork in Ngozi province in northern Burundi,
between June 2013 and November 2014. The fieldwork combined interviews, focus group
discussions, participation in workshops and seminars, and observation. A total of 55
semi-structured interviews was therefore realised with land users (men/women, dis-
placed/non-displaced), family heads, traditional elders (mushingantahe, singular; bashin-
gantahe, plural; Kirundi), government representatives at various levels (hill2, commune,
province, central), and representatives of international development agencies and civil
society organisations involved in designing and implementing land governance reforms.
The informants were selected in order to represent the diversity of social and institutional
categories related to land governance. This was carried out based on their position in
authority structures, geographical accessibility, willingness to participate in the research,
and involvement in specific land disputes and land registration operations. The interviews
explored actual configuration of actors, processes and practices of land governance, and
how land disputes resolution and the formalisation of property rights are regulated and
managed. Additionally, eight focus group discussions gathering a total of 52 people were
organised with hill authorities, bashingantahe, and local community members (men and
women separately). Different topics including customary rules, land allocation and own-
ership, land dispute resolution, land registration, land and power relations were covered
during these meetings. The researcher also participated in several stakeholders’ meetings
organised by the Coordination Unit of the national land programme, and in workshops,
seminars, and national and regional conferences. These meetings gathered donors, repre-
sentatives of international development agencies, representatives of local and central gov-
ernment structures, and representatives of civil society organizations around issues
related to on-going processes of land law and policy reforms and their implementation.
Through these gatherings, the researcher also assessed the interactions and power rela-
tions among formal/informal local/central institutions, and the challenges encountered in
land reform processes and the implementation of new policies and regulations.
The next section presents the approach for analysing the impacts of land reforms and
institutional pluralism in governance processes and practices. The third section examines
the historical development and sheds light on the institutional dynamics in land gover-
nance in Burundi, with a particular focus on the aftermath of the 2000 Arusha Peace
Agreement. Through the case study of Ngozi province, the fourth section shows the mani-
fold outcomes of land governance reforms in terms of diversifying the number, roles and
rules of land-related institutions at the local level, enhancing the resolution and preven-
tion of particular land disputes, and increasing the authority of the state in land registra-
tion. Moreover, it explores how land governance reforms contributed to mixed
perceptions of the state and contrasting notions of secure land tenure at the local level.
The last section discusses challenging dynamics in local land governance in conflict-
affected Burundi and elaborates some conclusions.
Analysing land governance reforms and institutional pluralism
In this paper, the outcomes of reforms on the governance of land disputes and the security
of tenure in the aftermath of peace agreements are analysed through the concepts of legal
pluralism and institutional multiplicity. The notion of legal pluralism is considered at the
intersection of legal, political and social science; it refers to the coexistence of multiple
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL LAW 3
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normative or institutional orders and their overlap within a given social setting (Griffiths
1986; Unruh 2003). By normative or institutional orders, Catherine Boone refers to struc-
tural frameworks of norms, rules or conventions aiming to sanction collectively binding
decisions; these also entail loci of political authority over property rights and the connec-
tions within and across different levels of land governance (Boone 2013, 190). These may
involve state law, customary law, religious law, project (donor) regulations, organizational
law, and other local or hybrid norms (Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). In practice,
institutional orders are dynamic and adjustable to social change. They can be interdepen-
dent and intersecting, as some institutional actors may borrow and apply norms, rules
and conventions from other institutional repertoires while fulfilling given land-governing
roles. Consequently, land governance processes underscore ideas of broader, often com-
plex processes, and dynamic interactions within and between diverse formal and informal
land governing actors with different relations of legitimacy and authority and notions of
which rules to apply. The ensuing competition with respect to whom is authorized to take
charge and under what specific circumstances, and which regulatory framework or norms
to apply for particular land and property issue greatly determines the outcomes of gover-
nance reforms (Kobusingye, van Leeuwen, and van Dijk 2016).
Actually, this paper demonstrates that examining land governance reforms merely as
processes of (re-) establishing the authority and legitimacy of the central government and
its decentralised structures in dealing with local land and property issues, and of creating
opportunities for clarifying, negotiating and formalising property rights over (pre-war)
landholdings, is insufficient for a critical appraisal of why they fail to produce the
intended impacts in conflict-affected settings. In analysing the intersection among land
tenure, legal pluralism and peace-building, Unruh (2003) points out that efforts aimed to
address secure access to rural land and property claims during and following violent con-
flicts are likely to foster the precarious rise of multiple and overlapping systems of norms,
rules and conventions, and thus add more confusion in already existing settings of tenure
insecurity. As a matter of fact, such transformations in land governance have significant
impacts in the rearrangement of power relations among a diversity of actors at different
levels, in unfolding profuse avenues for dealing with land access and property claims, and
even in intensifying struggles over land tenure (Kobusingye, van Leeuwen, and van Dijk
2016; van Leeuwen 2017).
In practice, land governance reforms occur in preexisting already complex settings
of legal pluralism in which multiple institutions sometimes with diverging interests,
asymmetrical power relationships and overlapping sources of legitimacy and authority
interact with one another, influence and enforce land and property issues. In conflict-
affected contexts, land tenure systems are generally battlefields for multiple state and
non-state actors for negotiating authority and legitimacy relations that are crucial in
determining access, use and control over land (Hirblinger 2015). Often, emerging
decision-making structures at various governance levels may reflect contested reconfi-
gurations of power relations and polarised politics, and therefore display an amplifica-
tion of previous situations of legal pluralism. Empirical observations suggest that
under such conditions policy changes are susceptible to enhance contestations over
which rules to enforce, especially when international frameworks for post-war resource
allocation are strongly imposed on existing domestic land tenure systems (Joireman
and Meitzner Yoder 2016; Unruh 2005). For instance, it is a challenging task for state
4 R. TCHATCHOUA-DJOMO
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actors to translate international legal standards on post-conflict property restitution
from paper agreements into local settings where the reach or the authority of the state
is contested or limited (Joireman and Meitzner Yoder 2016). In a situation of legal
pluralism, access to resources is always negotiable and uncertain, being the result of
social and power relations (Berry 2009; Meinzen-Dick and Pradhan 2002). Resource
users usually appeal to multiple institutional orders while negotiating access to resour-
ces in contexts of competing claims and changing environmental and social condi-
tions – a phenomenon described as forum shopping (von Benda-Beckmann 1981).
Nevertheless, rules, rights and practices are susceptible to be challenged and cancelled
through resort to state law or state actors (Lavigne Delville 1999).
Although forum shopping allows parties with competing claims strategic scope of
action to target specific institutions to present their claims, it may also put them under
multiple institutional pressures. The most powerful institutions may impose their proce-
dures and rules, and therefore restrict access to and the authority of those institutions
legitimised and privileged by contesting parties. For instance, in his account on how dif-
ferent donors, international development organisations, and the central government-led
attempts to improve local land tenure security have resulted in contrasted impacts on
local tenure insecurity and peace-building during the post-conflict and post-disaster
period in Aceh in Indonesia, Arthur Green highlights that failure to understand the inter-
connectedness among the existing diversified norms, customs and conventions, and their
roles in shaping local land access and ownership during the conflict has misguided the
land reform process (Green 2013). Hilaire Tegnan makes similar analysis in his study of
land administration and legal pluralism in West Sumatra by demonstrating that, instead
of preventing and settling local land disputes, legal reforms and decentralisation of land
management rather result in increasing struggles over land due to uncoordinated and
contradictory regulations embedded in customary, religious, and statutory institutional
orders, to overlooking the complexity of customary law and tenure systems, and to unful-
filled political promises (Tegnan 2015).
From what precedes, analysing the current outcomes of land governance reforms
implies a closer look at the transformations in the regulations, norms and conventions
determining access to land and property rights, the reconfigurations of roles, power rela-
tionships and everyday governance processes and practices of a variety of (non) state
actors, and how different resource users navigate the diversification of institutions while
making their claims to land. As the case study of conflict-affected Burundi will demon-
strate, land governance reforms have relatively improved the resolution and prevention of
certain land disputes and the land administration system. However, they have failed in
bringing a solution to the competing claims over the land occupied by the internally dis-
placed people (IDPs) and in improving local security of tenure. Land reforms play into
the proliferation of institutions and unequal relations of authority and legitimacy among
various institutional actors in regulating local land tenure and property rights. This has
further consequences on how the roles of the state and different institutional actors are
understood, on the nature of the relations between land governing authorities, as well as
on how secure land tenure is perceived. Prior to exploring empirical evidence of such
dynamics of land reforms, the institutional entanglements in land governance, and their
repercussions for tenure security, the next section explores the historical background of
land governance in Burundi.
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL LAW 5
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Historical development of land governance in Burundi
An overview of the changes in land tenure in Burundi is required to understand its cur-
rent forms and to assess the nature and extent of recent reforms. Based on Gilbert Bigiri-
mana (2013b), these proceedings can be explored along three historical periods: (i) the
pre-independence period characterised by a monarchy ruling system followed by a colo-
nial regime, (ii) the tumultuous post-independence period until the signing of the 2000
Arusha Peace Agreement, and (iii) the aftermath of the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement
characterised by several land governance reforms aimed at enhancing tenure security
through land disputes resolution and the registration of property rights.
The pre-independence period
Before the colonisation by the Germans, local populations entrusted the Burundian
King – the Mwami – as their main spiritual and political leader, to govern land and other
natural resources, through a customary and decentralised authority system involving the
princes, royal elites, customary elders or bashingantahe, and area chiefs. Land was collec-
tively held and used within patrilineal clans and lineages. To acquire a piece of land or to
expand landholdings, family heads were introducing their requests to the area chiefs. Cus-
tomary elders played the role of custodians of the local memory on land tenure, and of
legal authorities in case of disputes.
The introduction and enforcement of the German (1903–1916) and the Belgian (1919–
1962) colonial rules significantly affected the Burundian customary land tenure. The
power of customary authorities in land allocation, use and control were tremendously
altered through the introduction of formal written legislation and mechanisms for
enhancing the demarcation and registration of property rights on land. In fact, under the
Belgian colonial ruling, statutory land tenure was developed and enforced along racial dif-
ferentiation between the Belgian and other white foreigners, and local/indigenous people.
Accordingly, land was divided in three major property regimes: customary property, state
land, and private/individual (registered) property.
Following the 1959 Rwandan Revolution and the influx of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in
Burundi, land control became a key concern in Burundi, as the Mwami and the royal elites
engaged in social and political movements to get their independence from the colonial rul-
ers. In this respect, in July 1960, in a blundering effort to counteract the rise of popular
claims for independence and to reinforce its authority, the colonial administration issued
an official statement enforcing the transfer of all non-registered customarily owned land
into the state property regime, with the direct consequence of denying customary entitle-
ments. Nevertheless, toward the independence of Burundi, the Mwami issued a Royal Edict
in August 1961 allowing for the formal recognition and registration of property rights on
customary land3 in order to reinforce his legitimacy and authority (de Clerck 1970, 1971).
Such enforcement of the formalisation of individual property rights on customary land
was later solidified within the 1962 Burundian Constitution (Art. 11 and 12).
The tumultuous post-independence period: 1962–early 2000s
The post-independence period was marked by divisions within the Burundian political
elites, which led to the suppression of the constitutional monarchy in favour of
6 R. TCHATCHOUA-DJOMO
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authoritarian and militarised regimes dominated by Tutsi elites (1966–2005) and Hutu
elites (2005–present)4. After the collapse of the constitutional monarchy and royal elites
after a successful military coup d’etat in November 1966, led by Captain Michel Micom-
bero (Ndarishikanye 1999), the existing land tenure systems, rules and norms remained
in use with few changes. Confronted with a new political and dominating leadership and
elites with ramifications within local communities, the formal land legislation was met
with very little enthusiasm by local populations for three main reasons. First, the 1961
Royal Edict and the 1962 Constitution provided very little details about the implementa-
tion of official land laws. For instance, de Clerck (1971) reported that officials from the
Ministry of Agriculture were facing difficulties in defining operational frameworks for
implementing the registration and transfer of property rights, and simultaneously for rec-
onciling formal land registration with the customary patrilineal land tenure. Second,
despite a significant bend in the authority and legitimacy of customary institutions and
norms due to political struggles for power and control, most peasants did not trust formal
institutions and government representatives to manage customary owned land; further-
more, many rural land owners were reluctant to spend limited financial resources for the
registration of customary legitimated entitlements and for acquiring land titles (Bukera
1970b). Third, in 1970, the regulation on the implementation of land registration had
been revised by the contested political establishment, raising the rate of cadastral and
titling fees, and therefore limiting the access of many citizens to land rights registration in
favour of the political elites (Bukera 1970a; de Clerck 1971). It is in such context that local
uprising and ethno-political killings occurred in April 1972, with the most severe outbreak
in southern provinces of Burundi. This led to the exile of hundreds of thousands Hutu
civilians to neighbouring countries and the abandonment of their land and properties.
This was mainly to the advantage of most political elites and militants of the dominant
political party Union pour le progres national (UPRONA).5
Few months after the accession of Jean-Baptiste Bagaza as the head of state in Novem-
ber 1976, he introduced four major legal reforms to regulate land rights and their formal-
isation. Bagaza’s official discourse was framed around the restoration of national unity
through modernising government institutions, with a particular focus on land gover-
nance. His first legal reform was the promulgation of a decree law in 1976 binding the
incorporation of customary owned land within the state land properties.6 The side effects
of the provisions of this law were the extensive regularisation of the grabbing of Hutu ref-
ugees’ land and other informally allocated land across the country. The second legal
change was the abolition of the customary patronage institution Ubugererwa7, which con-
tributed to endowing many abagererwa (servants) with property rights on shebuja’s (land-
lords) land they have exploited for more than seven years. The third legal change was the
extension of the prescription rule to customary owned land8. In other words, every land
occupied over a period of 30 years regardless of the nature of the acquisition modes ought
to be automatically converted into state-acknowledged full ownership. The fourth legal
change consisted in the compilation and promulgation of the first Burundian Land Code
in 1986. It formed an essential legal instrument embodying principles and rules applicable
to the articulation and formalisation of land ownership rights. A great emphasis of the
1986 Land Code was the empowerment of provincial government authorities in allocating
land and the setting of a decentralised land administration and titling system. However,
due to political turmoil and financial and technical limitations, the expected
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL LAW 7
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decentralisation of land services provision did not follow. For instance, instead of setting
up decentralised land titling structures, the existing Division of Land Titles remained the
central government structure empowered to deliver land titles, and was simply moved
from the Ministry of Agriculture to the Ministry of Justice. This institutional transfer
aimed to stress and reinforce the authority of the judiciary administration in delivering
and sanctioning land titles and property rights. Likely, the 1986 Land Code did not bring
meaningful changes in the governance practices, and therefore received many criticisms
from land experts who argued it was a mere replication of colonial land laws and failed to
reflect and address the duality of land tenure regimes represented by the customary and
statutory land systems (Bigirimana 2013b; Kohlhagen 2011a).
Between the late 1980s and the late 1990s, several attempts to change the legal and
institutional frameworks and policies have failed or have been interrupted because of fur-
ther military takeovers, localised land-related violence and new waves of forced displace-
ment. Soon after the seizure of power by Pierre Buyoya in 1987, he established the
Ministry of Regional Planning and Tourism in 1988, which was empowered to set up a
specific administration for managing the environment and land services. Nevertheless,
considering the centralisation of decision-making power, the limited technical and finan-
cial capacity of the government, and the prevalent political instability, this new govern-
ment structure had limited reach to local communities where the bulk of land-related
operations and problems were located.
A further reform initiative was the drafting of a regulatory framework for the improve-
ment of the governance of customary land. A key idea supporting this reform process was
the rising concerns of some international actors about the failure of land titling to ensure
tenure security in most African countries, and the need to acknowledge and to integrate
the socio-economic realities of rural farmers into land policies. Subsequently, thanks to
the technical and financial support of the United Nations Organisation for Food and Agri-
culture, a project to reform the Burundian land laws was launched in early 1990s with the
aim of designing a Rural Land Code focusing on the reinforcement of local land tenure
security, agricultural development and natural resource management. More importantly,
the intended legal framework and policies were meant by (inter) national actors as a miti-
gation mechanism to the rising contestations over land access and property rights by
increasing the protection of customary land rights and arrangements through an indepen-
dent investigation process on litigious land and a generalised land registration system
(Kohlhagen 2011a). Unfortunately, the eruption of a protracted civil war in 1993 inter-
rupted this land reform initiative. In fact, under the existing 1986 land code, the country
experienced a considerable rise of land disputes and several illegal land allocations, espe-
cially on rural land. By fostering the recognition of customary rules and the formalisation
of customary land entitlements the intended legislation reform was expected to diffuse
those tensions over land in local communities.
The 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement and its aftermath
By the end of the civil war, the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in 2000 stimulated
the Burundian policy makers to pick up the thread of land governance reforms as a key
requirement for peace-building and state reconstruction, considering the various chal-
lenges related to refugees’ repatriation, competing claims over land access and property
8 R. TCHATCHOUA-DJOMO
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ite
it L
eid
en
 / L
UM
C]
 at
 08
:08
 09
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
18
 
rights, and local land governance in the post-war setting. These land reforms were also
intended to transform the centralised and undemocratic governance practices under the
former political regimes. Since 2000 therefore, two key areas of land governance in Bur-
undi have changed tremendously: the resolution of land disputes, and the registration of
property rights and land administration.
The 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement acknowledged the importance of setting up a speci-
alised government structure dealing with displacement-related land disputes. Therefore,
the Commission nationale pour la rehabilitation des sinistres (CNRS) was first created in
2003, but was later replaced by the Commission nationale des terres et autres biens
(CNTB) in 2006 after the accession of Pierre Nkurunziza as the head of state. Since then
the CNTB is officially the prime institution allowed to sort out local land disputes involv-
ing former refugees and IDPs. Furthermore, the Cour speciale des terres et autres biens
(CSTB) was formed in 2014 as the supreme judiciary structure empowered to pronounce
judgements on appeals to the final decisions rendered by the CNTB on displacement-
related land disputes. For other general local land disputes such as encroachment of land
boundaries, contested land sales, or intra-family disputes about sharing inherited land,
local people used to refer to other existing institutions such as family heads, traditional
elders, local government authorities or judicial authorities.
Moreover, the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement provided for the reorganisation of the
existing land administration system and the revision of the 1986 Land Code9 to address
land tenure insecurity and to improve land services provision in general. For instance,
through a presidential decree in 2003, the existing Division of Land Titles was renamed
into the Directorate of Land Titles and National Cadastre in order to stress the relevance
of the operations of demarcating, measuring and registering land.
Parallel to this, a draft revised Land Code proposal was produced in 2004. Yet, this pro-
posal was criticised for its strong congruency with the initial land law document. For
instance, Dominik Kohlhagen noted that, despite its 650 remarkable articles content, its
structure was very similar to the 1986 Land Code, and some legal ambiguities, such as the
thirty years prescription rule and the absence of dispute resolution mechanisms, remained
unaltered (Kohlhagen 2011a). Amidst the first post-war presidential elections in Burundi,
the draft revised Land Code was put on hold. Yet, land governance remained at the centre
of the electoral campaigns and political debatesby the framing of displacement-related
land disputes along ethnic and political antagonism (APDH and Global Rights 2005).
With the accession of Pierre Nkurunziza10 as the head of state in 2005, the idea of
decentralising government structures and revising land laws was explored further. Effec-
tively, with respect to the 2005 Constitution, the Burundian government adopted a decen-
tralisation law11 aimed at creating, reorganising and empowering communal and hill
administrative authorities, in order to increase the presence of the state at the local level.
Moreover, as the new political leadership did not participate in the decision-making pro-
cess that led to the 2004 draft revised Land Code, it rejected this legal reform proposal
(Bigirimana 2013b; International Crisis Group 2014a; Kohlhagen 2011a). Instead, in
2007, the Nkurunziza government engaged in another land-related legal and institutional
reform process with the technical and financial support of international aid agencies. A
core idea guiding this reform process was the restoration and the modernisation of the
land administration and tenure systems, with the assumption that this would contribute
to strengthening land governance, reducing land disputes and fostering the security of
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tenure. A revised Land Code was therefore adopted in 2011, with a focus on the creation
of the communal land registration office (service foncier communal, SFC). This is a local-
ised land registration structure within the decentralised communal administration, with
the dual goal of enhancing the formalisation of customary land rights at lower costs and
reducing local land disputes. It is intended to deliver land certificates, supervise and moni-
tor land transfers on customary land, and to assist other land institutional authorities in
dispute resolution and mapping state-owned land.
In parallel, the Directorate of Land Titles and National Cadastre was split into two dis-
tinct central structures in 2007: the Directorate of Land Titles remained within the Minis-
try of Justice while the Directorate of National Cadastre was moved to the Ministry of
Public Works; the latter was redirected to the Ministry of Water, Environment, Regional
Planning and Urban Development (MEEATU, French acronym) in 2011. Nevertheless,
the decentralisation of these two administration systems to facilitate the formalisation of
property rights is not effective across the whole territory, and is limited to few provinces.
There exist only three government offices in charge of land titles, respectively in Bujum-
bura, Gitega and Ngozicities. There are four regional cadastre offices that cover a number
of provinces: Bujumbura office (Bujumbura City, rural Bujumbura, Bubanza, Cibitoke),
Bururi office (Bururi, Rumonge, Makamba, Rutana, Mwaro), Gitega office (Gitega, Karusi,
Ruyigi, Cankuzo), and Ngozi office (Ngozi, Kayanza, Muyinga, Kirundo). In order to
facilitate access to their services, the regional land titling and cadastre structures work in
collaboration with the MEEATU provincial offices in charge of regional development and
urban planning . These provincial structures provide information about the different steps
of the titling procedure, deliver the official letter authorising payments for acquiring land
on state-owned land, and the certificate of conformity on customary land to people willing
to formalise individual property rights. By the end of the 2000s, it was recorded a total of
only 46,000 land plots registered in the National Land Titles Register, which is less than
one per cent of the country size (Kohlhagen 2011a, 5).
Even though the Burundian government is dedicated to uplifting its land administra-
tion and local land governance, government officials at provincial, communal and hill lev-
els, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil-society representatives interviewed
generally argued that the actual distribution and implementation of regulations display
critical ambiguities. The implications of such ambiguities at the local level are crucial for
our analysis. While policy, legal and institutional changes aim at improving and strength-
ening land governance in terms of efficient land administration, tenure security and dis-
pute resolution, their implementation and the distribution of roles among (non-) state
institutions largely determine the outcomes of reforms. This raises the question to what
extent tenure reforms actually and effectively provide for the enhanced, coordinated and
harmonised governance of land in the aftermath of the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement in
Burundi.
Implementing land reforms, institutional proliferation and mixed outcomes:
the case of Ngozi province
The case of Ngozi province – the native region of the President Nkurunziza – profusely
characterises the actual challenges and outcomes of the implementation of the land gover-
nance reforms grounded in the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement (see Figure 1). Thirteen
10 R. TCHATCHOUA-DJOMO
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years ago, a high demographic pressure of about 445–800 inhabitants per km2, the long
duration of internal displacement and the increasing land scarcity in Ngozi were already
raising great concerns about the heightened competition for land and the relocation of
former refugees and IDPs (APDH, CARE, and Global Rights 2004; International Crisis
Group 2003). As in other conflict-affected regions of Burundi, the main sources of tenure
insecurity in Ngozi have been the lack of official proof of land property rights and land
disputes over land grabbing, irregularities in land sales, issues of women’s land inheri-
tance, contestations about the sharing of family land, competing claims for the restitution
of pre-war land holdings, frequent contestations of past land arrangements, and disputes
over the management and occupancy of agricultural marshland (APDH, CARE, and
Global Rights 2004). These specific features have motivated the selection of this province
as a pilot area for testing and implementing land governance reforms in the late 2000s.
Ngozi has been praised for being the first province in which all the nine communes run
operational communal land registration offices and where the majority of land plots have
been demarcated and recorded in the communal land registries. Three years before the
adoption of the 2011 Revised Land Code, the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooper-
ation (SDC) launched its decentralised land governance programme in two communes of
Ngozi province: Ruhororo and Marangara (Bigirimana 2013b). By 2014, the SDC contrib-
uted to the creation of communal land registration offices in four other communes
(Ngozi, Kiremba, Tangara and Nyamurenza), while the International Fund for Agricul-
tural Development (IFAD) helped the remaining three communes (Gashikanwa, Busiga
and Mwumba) in establishing their respective communal land registration offices (see
Figure 2). By focusing on two key areas of land governance – the settlement of land
Figure 1. The 18 provinces of Burundi with Ngozi highlighted.
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disputes and the formalisation of property rights and administration of land – in the
remainder of this section, I will examine how the changes in legislation and policies and
the multiplication of regulations and institutions have impacted local security of tenure.
The intricacies of land disputes resolution
Of major concern in the official discourses and political debates since 2000 was the diver-
sification and proliferation of land disputes, and thus the urgent need for empowering
existing institutions and creating new institutions intervening in dispute resolution. Dur-
ing the fieldwork, all interviewees pointed out the differentiation between how displace-
ment-related land disputes about the restitution of pre-conflict landholdings to refugees
and from IDPs and how other general land disputes were approached by the state. More
specifically, provincial authorities and NGOs agents involved in land certification projects
emphasised the highly political sensitivity and imbroglio of displacement related land dis-
putes in the IDP settlements in Ruhororo commune (see Figure 2).
Dealing with general land disputes
These land disputes included intra-family disputes about the division of family land, land
boundaries encroachment, disputes on marshland, and contestations of past land sale
agreements on family land by the younger generation. At the time of fieldwork, such dis-
putes were mostly reported to and settled by customary leaders (family heads and tradi-
tional elders/bashingantahe) and local government authorities including ten-household
heads, sub-hill chiefs, hill chiefs, area chiefs and/or the communal administration authori-
ties. In the past, one hill chief was in charge of two or three hills, and the communal
Figure 2. The communes of Ngozi province and the research areas mentioned in the case study.
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administrator was ruling without a communal council; the central government and the
ruling party were appointing local government authorities. Nevertheless, since the signing
of the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement and the adoption of a multiparty and power-sharing
model of government enshrined in the 2005 Constitution, there have been tremendous
changes in the structure, the composition and sources of authority and legitimacy of local
government authorities. Every commune is headed by a communal council and a commu-
nal administrator elected by and from local communities for five years on the basis of
blotted lists of 30 (2005–2010) or 15 (since 2010) names of people affiliated to authorised
political parties. At the hill level, rather than appointed individuals, there is a council of
five hill chiefs playing the role of representatives of the communal administration; they
are individually and politically elected by and from local communities for five years also,
with the main hill chief being the person scoring the highest number of votes. The council
of elected hill chiefs appoints sub-hill chiefs and ten-household heads after consulting
with the communal administrator. Within a commune, hills are grouped in several areas,
which are headed by area chiefs. For each area, the communal administrator appoints an
area chief from the local communities and on the basis of its political affiliation. Local
judges are appointed by the Minister of Justice for an undetermined period of time.
Regardless of the variability in the sources of authority and power, these institutional
actors usually came from within the local communities and the province, and therefore
shared a relatively good local knowledge and sense of “closeness” with one another and
with local populations. For instance, despite the erosion of the legitimacy and authority of
traditional elders (bashingantahe) (Kohlhagen 2010) and their exclusion from local gover-
nance by the central government in 2010 (Kohlhagen 2011b), they were still very much
consulted in land disputes, and their ruling in intra-family land sharing and encroach-
ment of land boundaries was well received in most communities. When one party
involved in land disputes was not pleased with the solutions recommended by customary
leaders and hill authorities, it was directed to the communal administration and the local
court (tribunal de residence). In case people wanted to appeal against a judgement ren-
dered by the local court, the next judiciary representation was the High Court (tribunal de
grande instance) in Ngozi town.
In general, most parties in land disputes would not bring their cases to the local courts
due the financial constraints for covering judiciary fees and regular and multiple transac-
tions and trips to the main city centres, the slowness of the judiciary process and increasing
lack of confidence in the judiciary system (see Kohlhagen 2009). Sometimes, local judges
would blindly apply the official legislation without proper verification of the authenticity of
the testimonies and documents presented by the litigants. In other situations, such as cases
about women’s claims of exclusion in family land sharing, of eviction and dispossession by
the family of late husbands, or even of domestic abuse and exclusion from accessing family
land when their husbands take concubines, local judges, communal and hill chiefs invoked
customary law, which marginalises vulnerable groups such as widows, daughters, unmar-
ried women and unrecognised children in land affairs. Actually, even though the role of
such authorities in dispute resolution is prescribed by the state legislation, it remains silent
on the rules and procedures to apply for different land disputes in general, as well as on
women’s inheritance rights on land in particular. This legal gap allows communal and hill
authorities to heavily rely on (personal interpretations of) customary norms and conven-
tions, or enacting their own decisions, as they considered suitable.
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The specific case of disputes over marshland constitutes a remarkable setting of institu-
tional multiplicity and ambiguity. As a matter of fact, the 2011 legislation recognises cus-
tomary tenure over marshlands, but also that these are state-owned properties and
therefore cannot be demarcated and registered by individuals and families12. Nevertheless,
in localities with large areas of agricultural marshlands, their distribution and use are reg-
ulated by the decentralised government structures in charge of agriculture under the
supervision of the governor of the province. In general, disputes about the types of crops
to grow and agricultural techniques in use are marginal thanks to the intensive involve-
ment of local representatives of the Ministry of Agriculture and the availability of agricul-
tural inputs and technical support provided by several development aid programmes and
projects such as PAIVA-B13 and PRODEFI14 from the International Fund for Agricultural
Development. However, when disputes about the limits between adjacent plots and con-
tested land transactions occurred, contestants preferred to refer to customary leaders who
were very knowledgeable about customary tenure, land distribution among clans and line-
ages, and the evolution of the locations of the irrigating canals separating different family
plots. Even local authorities at the hill level were much inclined to rely on the mediation
and judgement of customary leaders when it concerned the marshlands. As the interview-
ees argued, most community members owning or using a piece of marshland were well
aware they could not formally claim property rights over such land and therefore could
not bring their disputes on marshland to government authorities out of fear of losing their
access to those fertile land. Remarkably, they were feeling more secure on those land plots
compared to hillside plots due to the resilience of informal and customary arrangements
and the legitimacy of customary leaders in enforcing collectively binding norms in case of
disputes.
Nonetheless, despite the diversity of local institutional authorities and the variability of
their roles in dispute resolution, several interviewees from local communities considered
that these authorities did not always fulfill the objectives of impartial arbitration/media-
tion and easily reachable dispute resolution. For instance, the traditional elders’ practice
of demanding for “local beer” either in cash or in kind before rendering their judgements
was contested by community members organised in associations through the work of
(inter) national NGOs. Moreover, given the extent of their responsibilities within local
communities and that they received petty remuneration for their services on an irregular
basis from the central government, hill chiefs15 and communal authorities requested
(informal) “transportation” fees, and local judges set unofficial charges for their services.
All these informal practices were detrimental to the protection of the interests and prop-
erty rights of poorer parties in the disputes.
Dealing with displacement-related land disputes
Over its two years of operations, the CNRS did not contribute much to the resolution of
displacement-related land disputes due to its centralised structure and limited funding
(Bigirimana 2013a; Zeender and McCallin 2013). In contrast, the decentralisation of the
CNTB at the provincial and communal levels was a prominent feature of its operations
on the ground for reducing displacement-related land disputes. However, most govern-
ment officials and representatives of civil society organisations and NGOs interviewed
argued that the presence and impacts of this government structure were less visible in
Ngozi province compared to the southern provinces of the country where the bulk of
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former refugees’ claims to land were located16 (Bigirimana 2013a; International Crisis
Group 2003; OAG 2005; Sinarinzi and Nisabwe 1999).
Actually, the local populations of Ngozi were mainly internally displaced during the
civil war; only a few proportion sought refuge outside the national borders. As argued by
the CNTB officials, most returned refugees managed relatively well to retrieve their pre-
conflict landholdings through the mediation of customary leaders, hill and communal
authorities and the support received from the testimonies of their witnesses17. The
achieved mutual arrangements for land restitution among the disputants were validated
and formalised by the issuance of CNTB land certificates (CNTB 2012a, 2012b). In fact,
the role of the central government in sensitising local communities about the repatriation
operations and the need to give back part of or all the family land plots of returning refu-
gees streamlined the implementation of the restitution process. In case the parties in land
disputes failed to reach a consensus at the hill and communal levels, they were redirected
to the CNTB provincial officials. After further investigation on the various claims and
hearing of the witnesses, the CNTB provincial officials made a formal land sharing deci-
sion, mainly for the benefit of returnees. While the CNTB legal framework and policies
have been revised in favour of full-land restitution instead of sharing arrangements
through a presidential decree since 2011, many interviewees argued not being worried by
the revised legislation because the majority of former refugees had recovered their land-
holdings before these reforms.
A well-known and noteworthy challenge faced by the CNTB and other local govern-
ment authorities in Ngozi province was the aversion of the IDPs to leave the camps in
which they have been resettled since the mid-1990s by the ruling authorities and with the
help of international humanitarian organisations. Coupled to that were the contested
claims of neighbouring communities for recovering their customary ownership rights on
part of the land that was appropriated by former ruling authorities to accommodate
IDPs18 (APDH and Global Rights 2005). Even if the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement
strongly recommended the closure of IDPs camps19 and the return of IDPs to their pre-
war family landholdings, the majority of IDPs, however, withheld their land occupancy in
the resettlement areas while simultaneously maintaining frequent access to and control
over their family’s land in nearby villages for farming. This situation fuelled violent con-
testations and clashes between IDPs and neighbouring communities on one side, and
between IDPs and the local government authorities claiming that part of the contested
land was state-owned land, and the CNTB provincial officials who issued an eviction
notice against the IDPs on the other side20. The main justifications given by the IDPs
interviewed about their reluctance and resistance to move out and to restitute the occupied
land were grounded in feelings of insecurity and deep mistrust against the current political
regime to protect their rights21. As one IDP in his late forties at the time of the fieldwork
testified:
We (IDPs) want to remain here (IDP camp) because we do not feel safe in our hills of origin.
What happened in 1993 might happen again; who knows? Even in 1993, we did not see the
war coming; it struck us like that. We want to stay here, that’s all! Our future is very uncer-
tain… Educated people (government authorities and CNTB members) are the most danger-
ous. We lack confidence in our rulers.
THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL PLURALISM AND UNOFFICIAL LAW 15
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ite
it L
eid
en
 / L
UM
C]
 at
 08
:08
 09
 Ja
nu
ary
 20
18
 
During the fieldwork, this complicated situation was described as a highly politically
sensitive issue under the Nkurunziza regime, considering the social identity of the contest-
ants in disputes, the CNTB and administrative provincial authorities, and the related poli-
tics. Actually, all remaining IDPs settlements included mono-ethnic populations –
Tutsis – who abandoned their family landholdings during the civil war and were relo-
cated under the protection of the former Tutsi-led and militarised UPRONA regime
(APDH and Global Rights 2005). In sharp contrast to the IDPs, the neighbouring com-
munities claiming customary rights on IDPs settlements and government officials were
identified as Hutus and/or pro-CNDD-FDD22 by IDPs. In this respect, some of these
authorities were further accused of mobilising youth from within the current ruling party
to infiltrate and attack IDP camps. As some key informants pointed out during informal
conversations, despite the application of the policy of ethnic and political proportionality
in the composition of government structures23, the majority of CNTB officials, the provin-
cial governor and its counsellors, and the heads of provincial and communal police forces
were mostly Hutus (and few Tutsis) appointed from within the ruling party (OAG 2013).
Whereas IDPs condemned the partiality of the government authorities and CNTB offi-
cials in supporting the claims and actions of neighbouring communities’ members to evict
them, most of these authorities denounced the rigidity of IDPs to positively respond to the
public policy of land restitution and the state ruling. They vividly decried the alleged polit-
ical allegiance of the IDPs for the party UPRONA, as well as the ambient ethno-political
apathy and grievances grounded in historical power struggles and violence (see OAG
2013). Actually UPRONA leaders were harshly criticised for regularly touring IDPs settle-
ments with political messages fuelling feelings of insecurity and presumptive life threats
from the CNDD-FDD partisans, and therefore prompting IDPs to rebel against the gov-
ernment command to reintegrate their pre-war localities. In exchange of electoral votes,
UPRONA leaders were also promising IDPs to permanently allocating them property
rights and land titles on the disputed land and financing development projects in the
camps24 (see Chretien 2002; Ndarishikanye 1999).
This imbroglio amplified the IDPs perception of the state as the enemy, and of the
whole issue of compelling them to return to their pre-war localities as a strategy to silence
them, considering that they would be scattered and more vulnerable against their former
perpetrators25. This led one representative from a civil society organisation to conclude
that the current legislation has failed to solve the land problem on the Tutsi IDPs camps.
Rather, this crucial land issue remains a political deadlock for central government author-
ities, which were unable to propose further solutions without exacerbating local tensions
and creating far greater problems26. Confronted with such reality, IDPs strategically
developed and reinforced a collective capacity to cope with their “hostile” environment
through increasing exchanges of information, goods and services, and human resources
and organising various social activities across different Tutsi IDPs settlements.
The dualistic land registration and administration system
By establishing localised land registration offices while preserving the existing land titling
administration, the Burundian legislation has developed a dualistic land registration and
administration system. The Land Titling and Cadastre offices, in collaboration with the
decentralised structures of the MEEATU continued to respond to individual demands for
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demarcating and registering private property rights in Ngozi province. In parallel, these
authorities were collaborating with the communal land registration offices for the identifi-
cation, demarcation and production of land titles on state-owned land, prior to starting
the registration of customary owned land.
The communal land registration office through the Commission de reconnaissance col-
linaire (hill surveying committee) was also responsible for assisting in the resolution of
general land disputes. The composition of the hill surveying committee varied across dif-
ferent hills and communes. Theoretically, one representative of the communal adminis-
tration and two nominated hill chiefs were de facto members of the hill surveying
committee due to their formal administrative position and authority in local affairs. Hill
chiefs had the duty to nominate one representative of the traditional elders at the hill level,
based on his availability and local knowledge on customary land tenure. They also had to
organise local elections for the selection of the remaining three members by and from
local communities and local associations on the basis of their good reputation. However,
in practice, several communal land agents and hill chiefs complained about the poor par-
ticipation of communal representatives in regular land operations at the hill level due to
their multiple and overlapping responsibilities at the communal level.
Considering that the legislation defines the role of the members of hill surveying com-
mittees as volunteering work, they were not regarded as paid workers either by the com-
munal administration or by the supporting organisations coordinating the land
certification projects. Subsequently, most hill surveying committee members were bitterly
disappointed for not receiving a compensation in return for their full-time services in
comparison to the communal land agents; for this reason, the rate of retraction from hill
surveying committees was high in the first two to three weeks of activities. Therefore, in
the land registration projects led by the SDC – focusing mainly on land demarcation and
the production of certificates – various incentives in cash and in kind (school fees for chil-
dren, small agricultural equipment, per diems, etc.) have been developed to increase the
participation and commitment of the hill surveying committeemembers. However, the
projects led by the IFAD, for which land certification was associated with agricultural
development, failed to do the same because of financial restrictions. Besides, while the
projects led by the SDC coupled individual and systematic land demarcation approaches27
in its areas of intervention in order to optimise its impacts on the ground, the projects led
by the IFAD favoured the individual demarcation approach to align with the current legis-
lation. These differences explained the gap observed between the communes supported by
the SDC and IFAD in terms of the number of applications for land certificates, and the
amount of land demarcated and registered.
In addition, the fees for acquiring a land certificate per land plot varied much across the
communes, ranging from 3% to 10% of the purchased price for purchased land, or from
1500 BIF to 30,000 BIF (equivalent to USD 0.88 to USD 17.51 respectively) on other
lands. Given that both the legislation on land and on the functioning of communes
remained silent about the required fees to be applied for the deliverance of land certifi-
cates, each communal council had the autonomy to set its own range of land certificate
fees. Such pricing was largely influenced by the amount of financial subsidy each com-
mune received from external actors for the duration of projects, and the approach used
for land demarcation. This locally based pricing practice was not seen to result in signifi-
cant increase in the number of applications for land certificates. Communal land agents
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and representatives from the land certification projects interviewed imputed this to the
poor living conditions of rural communities members and their reticence to apply for
land certificates on customary and family held land. While most community members
entrusted their customary leaders to maintain their authority on customary land tenure,
others were not ready to proceed to the division of family land among the family members
yet. In fact the continuous division of family land over generations had resulted in a criti-
cal decrease of plot surfaces and increasing competition among close relatives. Since the
introduction of land certification, such land disputes were occurring not only within the
same generation after the death of the family head, but also between parents and their
male descents claiming their portion of customary land inheritance.
Most interviewees pointed out that the majority of community members paying their
land certificates fees were owners of purchased land and middle-class people. A significant
proportion of registered purchased land plots were located in urban neighbourhoods such
as Ngozi city. Considering the high costs related to cadastral and land titling processes for
the average citizen, the 2011 legislation provided for the possibility to transform land cer-
tificates into land titles28; therefore, urban landowners in Ngozi city for instance were
more inclined to register their property rights with the communal land registration offices.
Consequently, officials from the provincial cadastre and land titling structures perceived
this practice as encroaching upon their jurisdiction and authority in formalising property
rights in urban areas, which emerged into tensions between the parallel land registration
administrations on the ground. The great amount of subsidies and technical support allo-
cated to the staff of the communal land registration offices were also a considerable cause
of discontent for the cadastral and land titling officials.
The establishment of a localised land registration and administration was much instru-
mental in improving the security of tenure on state-owned land and the authority of
decentralised government officials. Thanks to foreign aid, the implementation of the
reforms contributed to the retrieval of property rights on irregularly appropriated state
land during the periods of violent conflicts, and reinforcing the role of cadastre and land
titling authorities in this. Besides, entrenching the local demarcation and registration of
land in the communal administration was effective in boosting the authority and legiti-
macy of the communal council and administration on the rural populations and within
the government system. However, the coexistence of a dual land registration and adminis-
tration had substantial impacts for the notions of securing land tenure and the role of the
central government at the local level.
Actually, the promotion of land certification minimised the need for land titles and, in
this, the role of the related local government structures. Even though many interviewees
were not sure about the legal differentiation between land titles and land certificates, they
believed that land certificates were offering the same benefits as land titles in terms of for-
mal securing of tenure, prevention of land disputes, and access to financial credit. While
there was hardly any evidence of a direct effect between holding a land certificate and
being granted credits by local financial institutions, land certificate holders were much
convinced about the protection of their property rights against further competing claims
from within local communities. This strong feeling of security of tenure emerged from
the public land demarcating operations under the supervision of communal land agents,
and in the presence of the representatives of customary leaders, communal and hill
authorities, and from the consensual arrangements on land boundaries. Hence, in case of
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further forced displacement, local land users strongly believed that the communal land
certificates registries would support their land claims and speed up land dispute resolu-
tion. At the same time, they expected that recording local land boundaries and property
rights, and keeping communal land certificates registries might enhance the rule of law in
the future, even in case of political upheaval.
The composition and the voluntary compliance of hill surveying committees provided
through the current legislation considerably increased the relative importance of existing
traditional elders as custodians of customary land tenure and of hill authorities for assess-
ing local claims of land ownership. The participation of representatives of traditional eld-
ers in the hill surveying operations provided community members with a sense of security
based on the historical role of these authorities as the custodians of local landownership.
Yet, traditional elders were not allowed by their peers to make decisions on land disputes
outside the council of traditional elders. Subsequently, when communal land agents and
the local government authorities supervising the surveying of the land failed to reach
arrangements on land boundaries and competing claims of landownership, they were not
recording the cadastral information on the contested land; instead, they were redirecting
the contestants toward their family councils, the council of traditional elders, the council
of hill chiefs or the local court of justice.
In parallel, at the time of fieldwork, on-going debate persisted to what extent the new
land registration and administration contributed to securing land tenure. Strikingly, the
endorsement of the land certification procedure by the central government also induced
perceptions of insecure land tenure, by largely spreading the information that not allow-
ing for the demarcation of one’s owned land during the systematic hill surveying opera-
tions was considered a serious offence against the central government. This led some
community members consider that the expansion of land demarcation aimed at assessing
citizens’ land properties for the future design and implementation of a major taxation sys-
tem. Other community members exploiting marshlands also imagined that local land sur-
veying helped the state to locate and register such land by the cadastre and land titling
authorities for further expropriation.
Such mixed feelings of tenure insecurity against the state were also shared about the
communal administration. At the time of fieldwork, most communal land registration
offices were still benefiting from the financial and technical support through the land cer-
tification projects, and therefore from a relatively good stability of the hired personnel
and the regularity of the members of hill surveying committees thanks to a significant
bonus system. However, based on observations from other communal land registration
offices in other provinces that had run out of external subsidies, some interviewees
expected that, at the end of the largely funded projects, the communal administration and
communal land agents might raise the land certificate fees in order to cover the costs
involved in the land certification process and in the functioning of the communal land
registration offices. In this respect, rent-seeking practices might emerge and therefore
threaten the credibility of communal authorities and members of hill surveying commit-
tees for protecting the property rights and claims of poor people, as well as the sustainabil-
ity of the land certification process29.
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Challenging dynamics in local land governance
In the aftermath of the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement, land governance reforms were
envisaged reorganising and assisting land-governing institutions in enhancing tenure
security through reducing land disputes, expanding the formalisation of property rights
with the aim of fostering peace-building at the local level. Nevertheless, as demonstrated
through the case study of Ngozi province, such reforms actually contribute to the prolifer-
ation of institutions, trigger the exclusion of particular institutions and increase confusion
about the roles played by different institutions through multiplying the rules, norms and
conventions to apply and providing various institutions with overlapping or limited
authority and legitimacy on land.
Thereby, those reforms have induced ambiguous impacts on the institutional setting
for land services provision and on the legitimacy of land-governing practices on the
ground. In Ngozi province, reforms in land governance have produced a patchy institu-
tional set-up in which customary land tenure and institutions are progressively being
absorbed within the statutory system, which threatens the resilience of customary land
arrangements and practices. Throughout past decades of violence and political turmoil,
the repeated efforts of the successive governments to reform the legal and institutional
frameworks in land governance, and to promote the individualisation and formalisation
of property rights have restricted the power and role of customary institutions as guardi-
ans of local land tenure and mediators in dispute resolution. Yet, despite the limited legiti-
macy they receive through the state, the authority of customary institutions continues to
be recognised by local people. Consequently, in a situation where customary tenure guar-
antees a relatively good level of security on property ownership, designing and imple-
menting new policy of registering land rights may not increase it (APDH and Global
Rights 2005).
As the case of Ngozi province also shows, the implementation of the new legislation
on land registration adds to institutional multiplicity and complexity by creating a paral-
lel land administration, increasing the responsibilities and tasks of existing communal
and hill authorities, and traditional elders in the mediation of local land disputes and
the surveying of land, and reshuffling the roles and power of different government
authorities. In this, the reforms also stimulate conflicting relations of authority and legit-
imacy between different government structures. Despite the interferences they create and
fuel in decision-making and land governing practices, they certainly contribute also to
establish, maintain and reinforce the local presence, authority and control of the Nkur-
unziza government over land. Nevertheless, the reforms paradoxically contribute to
developing scepticism and indeterminacy against the state. The government continues
to be perceived as not reliable by a portion of the local populations. Actually, some local
people believe that most reforms are intended to limit their access to and benefits from
land.
Moreover, the persistent disputes related to the land occupied by the IDPs settlements
over the past decades underscore how past violence and forced displacement can result in
protracted contestations about land and mingle with ethno-political antagonism and
manipulation. It is therefore not surprising that while new policies, legislation, institutions
and governing practices have contributed to mitigating many land disputes and to legiti-
mise property ownership in many communities, they have remained unsuccessful in
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conciliating diverging claims and pacifying tenure relations over the land occupied by
Tutsi IDPs. This institutional impasse has caused local people to limit confidence in the
capacity of the current government to question effectively the validity of competing claims
on land and to take responsibility for decisions and practices of former governments. As a
matter of fact, when certain disputes over land rights find their roots in past civil violence
and unclear and contested tenure arrangements, governance reforms alone may not be
sufficient to reorganise local tenure relations and to improve secure land tenure. The case
of Burundi provides critical insights on the need for greater sensitivity to the impacts of a
long history of governance reforms in changing and ethno-politically volatile settings on
land tenure relations and power dynamics at the local level. This aligns with previous
analyses of land reforms and land disputes in Burundi (see International Crisis Group
2014a; International Crisis Group 2014b; Kohlhagen 2011a) which highlight the impor-
tance for Burundian policy makers and development aid agencies to move beyond sim-
plistic and broader understanding of and approaches to complex land disputes and tenure
insecurity in the aftermath of the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement in favour of a more
inclusive and socially sensitive agrarian and land reform that reconciles statutory and cus-
tomary institutions and processes in land service provision and dispute resolution. Like-
wise, the way in which land-related local conflicts are interpreted and the extent to which
local conflicts resolving institutions and arrangements are considered will have implica-
tions for legitimising the authority of government institutions and the state in local land
governance.
Notes
1. Burundi is a densely populated country, with a size of 27,836 km2 and an estimated population
of nearly 11,900,000 inhabitants, of whom more than 90% are still depending on subsistence
agriculture. The combination of these factors with land scarcity and poverty put the majority
of its population at risk of food insecurity.
2. The hill or colline is the most basic administrative unit in Burundi.
3. Edict of theMwami no. 5 of 10/08/1961.
4. See Durand-Lasserve (2006), Lemarchand (1996), Wittig (2016) and van Acker (2016).
5. For example: Land allocation decisions issued by the communal administrator of Rumonge
following the letter of the Governor of Bururi on 18/08/1972 instructing for the distribution of
land properties of the exiled Hutu 'rebels'.
6. Decree-Law no. 1/191 of 30 December 1976.
7. Decree-Law no. 1/19 of 30 June 1977 stating the abrogation of the institution Ubugererwa.
8. Decree-Law no. 1/20 of 30 June 1977. Before this decree, the prescription rule was only appli-
cable on registered land.
9. See the 2000 Arusha Peace Agreement, Protocol IV, Chapter 1, Article 8.i, p.89.
10. Pierre Nkurunziza is the former leader of the Hutu rebel group called the Conseil National
pour la Defense de la Democratie et Forces de Defense de la Democratie (CNDD-FDD), which
became the dominant political party since 2005.
11. See Article 263 of the Burundian Constitution of 18 March 2005; and Law no. 1/02 of 25 Janu-
ary 2010 revising the Law no. 1/16 of 20 April 2005 on the organisation of the communal
administration.
12. 2011 Land Code, Art. 438 to 451.
13. Programme d'appui a l'intensification et a la valorisation de l'agriculture au Burundi.
14. Programme de developpement des filieres.
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15. In fact, only the first hill chief receives a petty and variable remuneration depending on the
financial capacity of the communal administration. Because the other four hill chiefs, area
chiefs, sub-hill chiefs and heads of ten households were unpaid, most of the time they were not
much involved in local dispute resolution; otherwise, they were asking contestants in land dis-
putes for informal compensation for their services.
16. Interviews, communal administrators Ruhororo, Marangara, Ngozi (9 and 12 May 2014). A
detailed analysis of the role of the CNTB in the resolution of land disputes involving former
refugees is presented in a separate article by the author in collaboration with Han van Dijk.
17. In the absence of official proof of property rights on customary land, customary leaders and
government officials were considerably relying on oral accounts provided by two or three wit-
nesses selected by each party in the dispute. The great challenge was the assessment of the
accuracy of the oral statements, especially because most elderly people with reliable local
knowledge on customary land tenure before the protracted conflicts have died.
18. Iwacu, ‘Site Ruhororo: bras de fer engage entre la CNTB et les deplaces’, 04 May 2012,
http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/site-ruhororo-bras-de-fer-engag-entre-la-cntb-et-les-dplacs-2/
(8 August 2016).
19. For more details on the internal displacement in Burundi, see International Crisis Group
(2015, 2016).
20. Interviews, communal administration Ruhororo (9 May 2014); representative of a civil society
organisation Ngozi (14 May 2014); IDPs (8 July 2014). Armel-Gilbert Bukeyeneza (Iwacu),
‘Affrontements entre jeunes du sites des deplaces de Ruhororo et la police.’ Iwacu, 27 Novem-
ber 2013, http://www.iwacu-burundi.org/site-des-deplaces-de-ruhororo-un-baril-a-poudre/
(8 August 2016).
21. Interviews, Ruhororo camp (25 June, 8 July 2014); Mubanga camp (8 July 2014).
22. Interviews, IDPs (8 July 2014).
23. The 18 March 2005 Constitution, Art. 129, 143, 164 and 168. The handbook of administrative
and financial procedures of communes, section II.1.1.
24. Interviews, representative of a civil society organisation (14 May, 3 September 2014).
25. Interviews, IDPs (8 July 2014).
26. Interview, Ngozi (3 September 2014).
27. The 2011 Land Code does not specify the approaches for land demarcation in the certification/
registration process.
28. 2011 Land Code, Art. 410.
29. Seminar gathering communal council members, communal administrators and communal
land agents to discuss the challenges land certification in Burundi, 16–17 October 2014.
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